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Institutional development and bank competitive transformation 
in late industrializing economies: the Spanish case  
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the contribution of national institutions to the competitive 
transformation of big commercial banks in late industrializing countries 
through the analysis of the Spanish case. The paper uses a comparative 
historical analysis to establish that strategic coordination between the state and 
large banks is a structural feature of the banking sector but may be articulated 
differently depending on the balance of power between states, banks and 
industry, the preferences of these actors, and their resources. Using evidence 
from Spain since the late 1970s, the paper argues that in this country, state-
bank coordination was articulated as a non-hierarchical system of negotiated 
interactions and mutual exchanges of benefits between small groups of 
decision-makers at the government, the central bank, and big banks. Under the 
Spanish model, large banks contributed to the fulfilment of public policy 
objectives to develop the central bank’s capacity to conduct monetary policy, 
strengthen supervision of the banking system and modernize the financial 
sector. In exchange, big banks benefited from a favorable regulation that 
enabled them to restructure, consolidate the leadership of a new generation of 
bankers, and reach the efficiency frontier of their industry. The paper 
contributes to the literature of institutionalism by questioning the traditional 
dichotomy between market and strategic coordination. It also contributes to 
the literature of competitiveness by stimulating debate about the role of the 
state in supporting the transformation of big business. 
1. Introduction 
Institutionalist scholars1 consider the structure of the banking sector to be a 
distinctive feature of different models of capitalism. However, the literature 
tends to base its analyses on examples of leading economies with well-
developed institutional structures2. Consequently, few contributions have 
analyzed the processes through which banking institutions evolve and 
consolidate, and the impact of institutional development on banking strategies 
and on the configuration of national models of capitalism.  
This paper contributes to filling this gap via an analysis of the Spanish case 
between the late 1970s and the late 2000s. The paper characterizes a symbiotic 
model of state-bank coordination based on non-market, non-hierarchical 
                                                 
1 Zysman (1983); Deeg (1999); Whitley (1999); Hall and Soskice (2001); Amable (2003); 
Herrigel (2010). 
2 Zysman (1983); Erturk and Solari (2007); Hardie and Maxfield (2010); Hardie and Howarth 
(2010). 
relationships and argues that this model played a critical role in the 
competitive transformation of Spanish large banks. Bank-state coordination in 
the Spanish model was based on negotiated exchanges of benefits and a 
careful combination of the resources and capabilities of the two actors. The 
closeness of state-bank interactions in the Spanish model differentiates it from 
market-led models. However, the inability of the state to implement 
institutional reforms without accommodating the interests of the big banks, 
and the banks’ ability to strike bargains that did not require them to provide 
patient capital for productive industry, distinguished the Spanish model from 
other European developmental models based on non-market coordination, 
such as France’s and Germany’s. In the Spanish model, big banks contributed 
to the implementation of state plans to overhaul and modernize the financial 
system. In exchange, the banks benefited from a favorable environment that 
enabled them to undertake the necessary changes to overcome historical 
disadvantages and reach the efficiency frontier. Under this model, however, 
productive industry found it difficult to secure the patient capital it needed to 
undertake a comparable transformation, which contributed to Spain’s sharp 
manufacturing decline.  
The Spanish case presents critical features that make it relevant to a general 
audience interested in bank transformation and models of capitalism. The 
description of the negotiation process through which Spanish banking 
institutions modernized and transformed sheds light on questions regarding 
institutional development and consolidation, particularly in the context of late 
industrialization. The overlap between Spain’s transformation and global 
changes in the banking sector provides an opportunity to examine to what 
extent conventional banking models are applicable in the post-liberalization 
era. In addition, Spain’s position in the European periphery, and the major 
institutional changes that transformed the country into an open economy and a 
fully-fledged democracy in the 1980s and 1990s offer insights that can 
resonate with other peripheral, transitional, and middle-income countries. 
Finally, Spain falls in the category of “mixed market economies” or hybrid 
institutional systems that do not rely primarily on either market or non-market 
forms of coordination. The political economy literature of models of 
capitalism has not yet been able to define the characteristics and performance 
mechanisms of hybrid models. However, it can be argued that most countries, 
including the majority of late industrializing economies, fall into this category. 
By undertaking the study of a hybrid case, this paper contributes to the 
scholarly understanding of mixed models, and through it, to the literature of 
contemporary forms of capitalism.  
 
The paper takes a historical perspective that relies on a combination of macro- 
and microeconomic analysis. A combination of these two levels of analysis is 
necessary to reveal the interdependencies that lie underneath state-bank 
interactions and the way they shape the Spanish model. This research design 
relies on the triangulation of data from different sources, with interviews 
secondary to publicly available data. The paper develops a comparative 
analysis of bank performance using specialized databases, annual bank 
reports, and additional information from other specialized sources, including 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD. The analysis of Spain’s banking 
institutions is based on information from parliamentary session transcripts, 
published laws, and published testimonies of key stakeholders. In addition, the 
paper uses sixteen semi-structured interviews with civil servants, public 
employees, and bank experts to complement, contrast, and interpret publicly 
available data, help fill gaps, and flesh-out industry-level developments. 
Whenever possible, the paper references published documents rather than 
interviews. 
The paper focuses exclusively on the trajectory of the Big 7 (Banesto, Bilbao, 
Central, Hispano Americano, Popular, Santander and Vizcaya), the historical 
group of Spain’s largest commercial banks, excluding other types of credit 
institutions, such as savings banks. The focus on big or systemic banks is 
consistent with the differentiated treatment they receive from the academic 
literature, central banks, and other banking institutions. It is also justified by 
the preeminent role the Big 7 played in the Spanish credit system throughout 
the period of analysis. This differentiates the Big 7 from savings banks whose 
operations and expansion, and therefore their size and ability to influence 
national institutional change, was less relevant before the 2000s. 
The rest of this paper is divided into five parts. Section two establishes the role 
of state-bank coordination in banking and showcases different ways to 
articulate the relationship through comparative examples. Section three shows 
changes in the characteristics and performance of the Spanish banking sector 
through quantitative and qualitative cross-country comparisons. Section four 
outlines standard explanations for the competitive transformation of big 
Spanish banks and discusses their limitations. Section five characterizes the 
Spanish model and connects it to the transformation of big Spanish banks. 
Section six summarizes findings, outlines general contributions and concludes.  
2. The institutional structure of commercial banking 
Problems of asymmetric information make the banking sector prone to 
disequilibria. If left unchecked, these problems can quickly escalate and turn 
into systemic financial crises that may provoke deep, protracted economic 
recessions. A public system of bank supervision is a crucial guarantee of the 
stability and efficiency of a credit system. Consequently, coordination 
between credit institutions—especially big banks—and states is a structural 
feature of the banking sector. Moreover, commercial banks provide essential 
services for any form of economic activity, a role that has historically 
prompted states to influence credit allocation, especially in bank-based 
systems. 
Postwar European financial systems were characterized by institutional 
diversity that stemmed from variation in the distribution of power among 
states, banks, and downstream industry; the preferences of these actors, and 
their respective capabilities and resources. Institutional diversity translated 
into structural differences in national banking sectors. France represented the 
paradigm of a state-influenced developmental system. Bank credit in France 
was an instrument for implementing broader industrial policies designed by a 
large bureaucratic apparatus, and credit controls were based on formal 
legislative procedures that oriented credit toward preferred firms.3 Loans from 
the Big 34 nationalized lending banks were the main sources of credit. These 
banks could hardly operate against the desires of the state and had relatively 
few incentives to forge strategic relationships with their corporate clients. 
The German financial system shared France’s developmental and bank-based 
nature, but the state maintained a more distant oversight through a system of 
public banks whose mandate was to promote development. Banks, not the 
state, were responsible for decisions regarding credit allocation, which was 
based on market criteria. These two features, a development mandate and 
responsibility for credit allocation, encouraged big German banks to acquire 
in-depth knowledge about their debtors, typically industrial firms. German 
banks were also allowed to invest in productive firms and represent 
shareholders who deposited their shares with the banks. These legal 
prerogatives further reinforced the banks’ interests in corporate decision 
making and enabled them to exercise it through board memberships.5 
By contrast, the United Kingdom’s financial system relied on highly 
developed capital markets and was strongly oriented toward protecting the 
sterling as an international reserve currency, rather than toward industrial 
development. Consequently, British clearing (commercial) banks were not the 
primary source of credit for large corporations, although their role in corporate 
credit and trade was still important in the postwar period and has strengthened 
since the 1960s.6 British bank loans, unlike German loans, tended to be short-
term and were guaranteed through assets rather than operations. Consequently, 
clearing banks did not need to acquire (and did not normally develop) an in-
depth knowledge of their debtors.7 Although the state in the United Kingdom 
did not own participations in clearing banks or strongly influence credit 
allocation, the Bank of England held close non-statutory relationships with the 
Big 4.8  
                                                 
3 Zysman (1983). 
4 Banque Nationale de Paris, Crédit Lyonnais, and Société Générale. 
5 Huffner (2010). 
6 Miles (2009); Davies and Richardson (2010). 
7 Zysman (1983). 
8 Barclays, Lloyds, Midlands, and Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Rapid, worldwide economic growth in the 1960s generated liquidity and 
fostered demand for new types of financial products and operations, 
particularly from large international corporations. Credit institutions catered to 
these needs with innovative products like the Euromarkets, which they could 
issue at low cost thanks to information and telecommunications innovations. 
The economic crises of the 1970s laid bare the limitations of industrial policies 
and led to state retrenchment in productive activities and the credit allocation 
systems that supported them. Changes in the interests and preferences of 
crucial economic actors generated pressure for institutional change. The 
additional risks derived from financial innovation caused financial crises 
triggering change. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, countries tended to formalize and overhaul 
the supervisory roles of their central banks and progressively eliminate capital 
controls. These changes were followed by others aimed at increasing 
competition, privatizing credit institutions, consolidating, and deepening 
wholesale markets. By the early 1990s, national systems had transformed into 
multilayered structures with international and national features. Cross-national 
coordination and supervision was organized around the 1988 Basel Capital 
Accord, followed by the Basel II revision of 2001–2006. Within Europe, the 
first and second Banking Directives and the adoption of the euro in 1999 laid 
the groundwork for the European Union’s Single Market. 
Despite these changes, national commercial banking structures and the 
interactions between banks and downstream industry did not converge toward 
a single model, even in Europe’s highly integrated context. Key aspects such 
as bank supervision, and therefore the solvency and risk management of the 
system, remained the responsibility of national central banks.9 Furthermore, 
despite common industry trends such as market-based financing, 
securitization, and the increase of fee-based activities, which modified 
business models, the underlying balance of forces among states, banks, and 
industry did not change uniformly across countries. As of 2015, there is no 
uniform European competitive environment either, which explains why local 
banks still handle the majority of retail banking operations in each Western 
European market and why banking sector consolidations to date have taken 
place primarily within rather than across markets.10  
The specific features that defined national banking models in the 1980s have 
changed, but national institutional diversity has persisted. Consequently, 
understanding the strategies and trajectories of big commercial banks today 
                                                 
9 This paradigm may change in the coming years due to the introduction of the EU Single 
Supervisory Mechanism in November 2014. However, as of December 2015, it is still unclear 
whether the SSM will lead to convergence in European commercial banking, and if so, how 
long the process will take. 
10 Vander Venet (2003) in Herrmann and Lipsey (2003); Cabral et al (2002). 
still requires characterization of the national institutional structures within 
which banks operate. In particular, the previous overview underscores the 
need to examine the balance of forces among national economic agents, the 
mechanisms through which they articulate their relationships, and the business 
preferences that derive from these systems. 
The varieties of capitalism (VoC) and the financial literatures are of limited 
assistance in mapping these features. VoC11 describes the structure of financial 
systems as a defining component of specific forms of capitalism, but authors 
have neither looked at the banking sector as an industry, nor evaluated the 
impact of changes in business dynamics over institutional structures over time. 
As a result, this literature under-theorizes the institutional conditions that help 
big commercial banks develop comparative and competitive advantages. In 
addition, VoC’s characterization of financial systems as either credit or 
capital-market based obscures two crucial factors: (a) that bank credit is an 
important source of capital in both types of financial systems12 and (b) that 
commercial banking features a high degree of non-market coordination, even 
in liberal market economies, such as the United Kingdom. In fact, a paradox of 
the VoC literature is that although it emphasizes coordination as a distinctive 
feature of different models of capitalism, it has not studied the presence of 
different forms of coordination in the banking industry or their impact on 
banks. 
The political economy literature of finance offers valuable information 
concerning the characteristics of national institutional systems, but has studied 
in less depth the connection between the “macro” level of institutional 
structures and the “micro” or firm level of bank competitive transformation. 
Recent contributions at the crossroads of international political economy, 
VoC, and economic geography13 chart changes in business models over the 
past three decades, especially since the late 1990s. However, these studies 
concentrate on connecting increasing levels of securitization, lending patterns, 
and the 2007 financial crisis. In addition, non-leading economies, such as 
Spain’s, rarely feature in these analyses. Where Spain appears,14 contributions 
focus on the connection among the corporate governance structure of savings 
banks, the availability of cheap credit in the post-euro era, and the 
unsustainable business practices that led to the savings banks’ crisis. The big, 
publicly listed commercial banks that this paper is concerned with are not part 
of these analyses. 
This paper argues that the Spanish banking model was based on direct 
relationships and mutual exchanges of benefits between the state (the 
                                                 
11 Zysman (1983); Deeg (1999); Whitley 1999; Hall and Soskice (2001); Amable (2003). 
12 Kosmidou et al. (2006); Hardie and Maxfield (2010); Davies and Richardson (2010). 
13 Erturk and Solari (2007); Hardie and Maxfield (2010); Hardie and Howarth (2010).  
14 Cuñat and Garicano (2010); Royo (2013). 
government and the central bank) and the so-called Big 7 (Spain’s big 
commercial banks). The basis of state-bank coordination was a system of 
interdependencies that stemmed from: (a) the existence of a pact subscribed to 
by all of Spain’s economic actors, which provided focus and direction to 
economic reforms; (b) the development and implementation of public policies 
consistent with that commitment; and (c) the presence of compatible state and 
bank objectives that neither actor could achieve autonomously.15  
The private nature of big Spanish banks, their human and financial resources, 
and the existence of a group of forward-looking and experienced professional 
bankers in control of final decisions guaranteed the autonomy of big Spanish 
banks from the state. In addition, the government’s commitment to economic 
development, the consistency of that commitment with policy formulation and 
implementation, and the existence of a cohesive group of skilled economic 
civil servants selected on merit prevented the Big 7 from capturing the state. 
The result was a non-hierarchical structure based on negotiated exchanges that 
helped both the state and the big banks overcome their weaknesses and further 
their goals. 
State-bank coordination in Spain had a strong developmental character but 
was different from the conventional post-war models outlined above. Intensive 
cooperation with the state for the purpose of achieving public policy goals 
distinguished the Spanish model from market-led models, such as the United 
Kingdom’s. Constraints on the state’s capacity to implement its vision 
autonomously also distinguished the Spanish model from state-led models, 
such as France’s. The Spanish state took the initiative on institutional reform, 
but due to the private nature of the Big 7, their control over the financial 
system, and their historical capacity for self- regulation, the state could not 
implement its goals without accommodating the banks’ interests. Furthermore, 
unlike France, Spain lacked a cohesive political-economic elite straddling 
government and industry that could have synchronized the interests of the 
state, big banks, and industrial corporations. 
Finally, the autonomy of big Spanish banks, the absence of a developmental 
mandate, and the secondary role of social intermediaries meant that, unlike 
consensual models such as Germany’s, Spain’s did not involve a compromise 
between bank profitability and industrial support. On the contrary, bank 
disengagement from downstream industry in Spain limited the financial 
                                                 
15 These weaknesses were partly a legacy of Francoism. Franco employed the divide-and-
conquer strategy and exercised it by issuing favors or imposing constraints arbitrarily, thereby 
weakening any potentially influential group in the country, and spurring confrontation 
between various groups and individuals (Preston 1986; Carr 1979 Lannon et al 1990). After 
Franco’s demise, established and emerging elites needed to coalesce to further their respective 
interests in a new context. 
options available for small and medium-size firms and contributed to a sharp 
decline in industrial capacity. 
The Spanish model proved resilient in the face of later events, such as changes 
in the governing party and the international expansion of big banks, because 
the defining features of the model—the presence of interdependencies 
between the state and big banks and the inability of either to accomplish its 
goals without the other—continued to be relevant.  
3. Overview of Spanish commercial banking 
This section is divided into two parts. The first provides a comparative 
snapshot of Spanish banking in 1985 and 2009. The second provides a more 
detailed account of the trajectory of big Spanish banks. 
3.1 Comparative overview 
This subsection offers a comparative overview of Spanish commercial banks 
through two snapshots at key points in time: 1985 and 2009.16 Bank 
performance is assessed through cross-country comparisons of operational 
efficiency, operational profitability, and capitalization measured through three 
ratios: operating expenses to income, net income to total assets, and Tier 1+2 
capital over assets. Analysis relies on data from the OECD banking income 
statement and balance sheet statistics. 
Ratio analyses do not account for interactions between performance and other 
factors such as national regulation, input costs, different business models, 
degree and quality of risk management, and the level and structure of 
competition. To overcome these limitations, this section relies on qualitative 
data and a brief evaluation of a sample of banks based on annual bank reports 
and the ECB banking statistics. 
In 1985, Spanish banks tended to be more profitable than those in the 
comparative set. Still, high profitability was not necessarily an indication of 
operational efficiency because Spanish banks operated in a context of little 
foreign and domestic competition. Relatively low competition can be inferred 
from the low number of credit institutions, and low operational efficiency can 
be deduced from high ratios of operating expenses to assets and operating 
expenses to income (Table 1).  
Big Spanish banks had less international experience than their European 
counterparts, were relatively smaller, and had limited exposure to competition. 
These features are attributable to Spain’s late industrial development, the 
smaller size of the country’s economy, and the legacy of Francoism.17 Many 
                                                 
16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2010).  
17 Francisco Franco ruled Spain through a dictatorial regime between the end of the civil war 
in 1939 and his death in 1975. 
of the world’s global banks were conceived as international banks and had 
extensive trade and investment experience. Spain’s limited and late 
industrialization and the inward-looking nature of the Francoist regime made a 
parallel development unfeasible. Even as late as 1996, the volume of Spain’s 
cross-border assets and their percentage of total loans were significantly 
smaller than those of all other major European economies.  
The Big 7 were small by international standards. The largest bank, Central, 
ranked 100th in the world and was about one-fourth the size of Deutsche 
Bank.18 Bank size partly derived from the dimensions of the Spanish 
economy. For instance, in 1985, the Spanish economy was 25 percent the size 
of Germany’s. Correspondingly, Spain’s volume of domestic credit operations 
was approximately one-fifth the equivalent measure in Germany.19 
Nonetheless, Spain had seven big banks, compared to only four in Germany. 
The lack of bank consolidation in Spain can be traced back to Franco’s 
strategy of ruling the country by dividing any potential opposition. As such, 
Franco vetoed an attempted merger of the two largest banks in 1965, after 
which there were no further consolidation attempts among the Big 7 until 
1987. 
Spanish banks had limited experience with competition. Until their reform in 
1988, Spain’s wholesale markets were “narrow, lacked fluidity, had a strong 
speculative component, and were very illiquid.”20 Furthermore, most licensed 
stockbrokers worked for the Big 7. Until 1989, savings banks—commercial 
banks’ natural competitors—were subject to strict constraints that prevented 
them from expanding beyond their province of origin and offering credit to 
businesses. Finally, until 1980 only four foreign credit institutions operated in 
Spain, all through exceptional individual concessions issued by Franco.21 
Restrictions to the activities of foreign credit institutions were not fully lifted 
until 1993.Unsurprisingly, big Spanish banks provided the majority of credit 
to industry, normally on a short-term basis (up to ninety days),22 except in the 
case of a few public-private monopolies.  
Big Spanish banks historically competed with one another through branch 
expansion due to legal restrictions to competition based on interest rates, 
commissions, or dividends. Between 1973 and 1983, the number of bank 
branches in Spain more than tripled from 5,437 to 16,046.23 Operational costs 
in Spain were relatively high, which suggests that branch expansion increased 
operational costs more than revenue.  
                                                 
18 Guillén and Tschoegl (2008). 
19 World Bank (2013). 
20 Pellicer (1992). 
21 Consejo Superior Bancario annual statistics (1985). 
22 Pons (2002). 
23 Fainé (2005). 
Upon the inauguration of the Single Market in 1993, big Spanish banks 
became attractive targets for the expansion of European banks. However, the 
threat of foreign acquisition never materialized. On the contrary, by 2009 big 
Spanish banks came out on top along several dimensions (Table 2). Despite 
Spain’s continuing reliance on large branch networks, in 2009, Spanish banks 
outperformed their rivals in terms of operational efficiency, which can be 
attributed to a rise in labor productivity (Table 3). Spain’s operational costs on 
an individual bank level were significantly lower than those of Germany, Italy, 
and the Netherlands, whose banking systems had comparable specializations 
in retail banking (Table 4). Despite decreasing margins for retail banking, 
Spanish banks were more profitable than those of countries like France, which 
obtained more than half of their revenue from more lucrative, fee-based 
activities. This was true despite relatively similar levels of concentration in 
both countries. Concentration of activities among the five largest institutions 
in France was 47 percent versus 43 percent in Spain; the respective Herfindahl 
indexes were 61 and 51 percent.24 Finally, data on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) show that Spanish banks had established a significant position abroad 
despite their lack of previous international experience. 
                                                 
24 European Central Bank banking statistics (2012). 
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Table 3 Annual person-based productivity, financial, and insurance activities.  
 
Source: European Commission and European Central Bank calculations based on Eurostat data. Own elaboration. 
Table 4 Market performance ratios for selected global banks in 2009. 
 
Source: Annual bank reports (2009). Own elaboration. 
*The cost-efficiency ratio is defined as total operating expenses divided by net operating income before loan 
impairment charges and other credit-risk provisions. 
3.2 The trajectory of big Spanish banks  
The Big 7 strengthened during Francoism. The Banking Act of 1946 gave big 
banks control of the market by prohibiting the foundation of new entities and 
heavily constraining competition with savings banks. Big banks also provided 
the largest share of capital for Spain’s industrialization in the 1960s and 
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1970s, multiplying their profit sixfold along the way.25 Furthermore, bankers 
gained political influence by lending the government their economic expertise.  
The industrial and banking crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s marked the 
beginning of the end of a profitable era characterized by restricted competition 
and cartelistic practices. By 1989, the context had radically changed into one 
dominated by competition based on new savings products and defensive 
mergers to prevent unwanted acquisitions in the run-up to the Single Market.26  
After a first round of mergers between 1988 and 1994, there was little room 
for big banks to grow rapidly through domestic acquisition, and they looked 
toward Latin America. Spain’s plans to adopt the euro in 1999 opened new 
opportunities for expansion and spurred a new round of national mergers 
between 1999 and 2002. In the 2000s, the two banks resulting from the merger 
of six of the Big 7, BBVA and Santander, continued their expansion, mainly in 
Europe and North America.  
Since the start of the financial crisis in 2007, big Spanish banks have 
continued to expand in emerging markets such as Poland, Ireland, China, and 
Turkey. Nonetheless, in 2011 big Spanish banks made extraordinary 
provisions in response to Spain’s real estate and sovereign debt crises. By 
2013, the presidents of the two banks expected to play major roles in a new 
round of consolidation in Spain.27 
4. Standard explanations for the transformation of big Spanish banks 
The two major existing explanations for the transformation of big Spanish 
banks identify firms as the main drivers of transformation. Within a firm-
driven approach, scholars follow two lines of inquiry. The first explains the 
international expansion of the Big 7 by looking at the detailed trajectories of 
individual firms. The second explores the performance of the Big 7 in the 
context of their relationship with the state by analyzing historical patterns of 
institutional change. This section outlines the two approaches, including a 
variant of the second line of inquiry, and explains their limitations. 
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4.1 Competitive advantages argument  
Most scholars examining the trajectory of the Big 7 focus on explaining their 
internationalization process.28 Of these authors, Guillén29 makes the most 
systematic analysis. He attributes the internationalization of big Spanish banks 
to a combination of leadership skills, business know-how, process and product 
innovation, and experience with mergers and acquisitions. The state does not 
play a major role in Guillén’s analysis.  
According to Guillén and Tschoegl,30 Santander’s president between 1986 and 
2014, Emilio Botín,31 embodied the innovative, discreet, diplomatic, and 
decisive leadership style of a generation of progressive bankers who took over 
the sector in the second half of the 1980s. Botín did not feel bound by the 
cartelistic practices of the Big 7, and his idea to launch innovative and 
competitively remunerated products in 1989 ignited a deposit war that 
unraveled the banking cartel. Botín’s public interventions were scarce, and he 
built relationships with Spain’s two major right and left wing political parties 
rather than declare his allegiance to any specific party.32 Finally, Santander’s 
acquisitions of Banesto in 1994 and Abbey in 2004—on which Botín 
reportedly had the final say—embodied the hands-on, top-down decision-
making style that enabled the Big 7 to make swift decisions and take 
advantage of unique investment opportunities for expansion. 
According to the competitive advantages argument, big Spanish banks honed 
their competitive skills throughout 1980s, as banking liberalization forced 
them to compete with savings banks.33 In addition, the Big 7 acquired 
experience in mergers through the acquisition of medium and small entities 
following the banking crisis of the 1970s to 1980s. Big Spanish banks further 
increased their experience in mergers during a first wave of consolidations 
among the Big 7 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When banking 
liberalization took place across Latin America in the 1990s, this knowledge 
enabled big Spanish banks to take advantage of investment opportunities in 
the region, and later in Europe and North America. Finally, the success of big 
Spanish banks can also be attributed to their specialization in retail banking, 
an area where they faced less competition from well-established global banks, 
which tended to concentrate on corporate or private banking. 
                                                 
28 Avedaño and Moreno (2004); Gil (2005); Guillén (2005); Parada, Alemany, and Planellas 
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Guillén and García-Canal (2010); Casilda Béjar (2011). 
29 Guillén (2005). 
30 Guillén and Tschoegl (2008). 
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32 Santander (2010); Financial Times. 25 January 2013. Emilio’s perfect storm. Accessed 26  
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4.2 Political-historical argument 
A second set of scholars explains the trajectory of the Big 7 through an 
analysis of the politics of financial regulation, the role of the banks in 
influencing institutional change, and the consequences of such changes for the 
banks. The political-historical argument highlights the state’s active role in 
enabling bank transformation. However, a comparison of the two main authors 
who articulate this argument underscores the difficulties of characterizing 
bank-state interactions. One characterization contends that the state acted 
primarily as an instrument of the Big 7’s interests (state capture). The other 
argues that the state supported the interests of the Big 7, but only in exchange 
for the banks’ cooperation to achieve the state’s public policy objectives. Both 
characterizations are based primarily on analyses of the Francoist period. 
S. Pérez34 connects the growth of the Big 7 during Francoism with Spain’s late 
industrialization and a waning state. She argues that the Big 7 came to play 
two crucial roles: they were the main providers of capital during the 1960s and 
1970s industrialization, and they became a hinge in the configuration of 
conflict among state elites. These two roles were the basis of a system in 
which big Spanish banks captured the policy-making process, consolidated 
their positions, and multiplied their profits.  
S. Pérez sees evidence of the long-term persistence of state capture in the way 
Spain addressed its public deficit in the 1980s, solved the 1977–1985 banking 
crisis, and liberalized the financial sector. She points out that in the 1980s, the 
Big 7 opposed the creation of a market for short-term public debt to help 
finance the public deficit because it would have meant that the state competed 
directly with big banks in attracting private savings, which were the banks’ 
main source of capital. In response to the Big 7’s concerns, the state did not 
immediately create a short-term public debt market but instead forced banks to 
purchase public debt by introducing a compulsory investment ratio. S. Pérez 
argues that this measure benefited the Big 7 because unlike a short-term debt 
market, it relied on the big banks as necessary intermediaries of the system. In 
addition, the compulsory investment ratio was a high-paying instrument that 
enabled big Spanish banks to maintain their profit margins in a context where 
declining demand for credit and excess liquidity made profits uncertain. S. 
Pérez finds additional support for the capture argument in the government’s 
1983 takeover of Rumasa, a large industrial conglomerate that owned a group 
of banks. Rumasa’s banks were large enough to threaten the position of the 
Big 7 and their expropriation and re-privatization eliminated the cartel’s 
largest rival. Finally, she explains that although in the late 1970s Spain took 
legislative measures to set the banking sector on the path toward eventual 
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liberalization, it did not simultaneously challenge the Big 7’s control of the 
financial system. 
Pons35 acknowledges the importance of ties between the Big 7 and the state 
and the role of regulation in articulating those interactions during Francoism. 
However, she refutes the state capture interpretation and sees the Francoist 
environment as one in which agents with different interests played each other 
off to further their respective goals. Pons contends that the Francoist 
governments of the 1960s and 1970s wanted to accelerate industrialization and 
reward valuable social and economic elites. The state offered advantages to 
the Big 7 to secure their cooperation in achieving these goals, and the banks 
accepted the advantages offered in return, but Pons argues that this does not 
mean the interests of the banks were necessarily aligned with those of 
Francoism. In fact, Pons contends that several bank leaders were renowned 
liberals36 and a number of government measures, such as mandatory 
investment coefficients that tied banks’ resources to low profitability 
investments, restrictions to the distributions of dividends, limits to branch 
expansion, and the government’s right to veto bank mergers, did not benefit 
the Big 7. Even so, Pons argues that the Big 7 were conscious of the benefits 
of maintaining good relationships with decision makers in a regime that 
operated by fiat and viewed collaboration with the Francoist dictatorship as a 
lesser evil. 
4.3 Limitations of standard explanations 
The arguments outlined above do not satisfactorily explain the competitive 
transformation of big Spanish banks. The competitive advantages argument 
fails to acknowledge the role of the Spanish institutional environment in 
enabling banks to unleash and exploit their capabilities, including the 
leadership potential of talented bankers, such as Botín. Therefore, the 
competitive advantages argument documents how the banks’ transformed, but 
it does not explain what enabled them to do so.  
The political-historical arguments show that the relationship between the state 
and big banks was crucial because it shaped the terms of competition for the 
sector. However, the differences between S. Pérez’s and Pons’s arguments 
underscore the difficulty of characterizing the state-bank relationship. Pons’s 
interpretation highlights the need to examine the alignment of interests of the 
two actors and explore the presence of exchanges in the relationship before 
confirming the state capture hypothesis.  
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Lladó, who was associated with Urquijo (Spain’s largest industrial bank). 
Finally, S. Pérez’s and Pons’s interpretations of state-bank relationships 
concentrate on the Francoist period and its immediate aftermath, excluding the 
period during which the Big 7 transformed their structures and reached the 
efficiency frontier. 
5. State-bank coordination in Spain 
This section provides an alternative explanation for the transformation of big 
Spanish banks based on the characterization of state-bank interactions. The 
first subsection traces the origins of the model to Spain’s political transition 
and defines its main features. The second subsection describes the model’s 
consolidation leading up to the Single Market. The third subsection explains 
the model’s resilience after the inauguration of the euro and the international 
expansion of big Spanish banks. 
5.1 Origins and main features (1977–1985) 
The structure of contemporary state-bank interactions in Spain can be traced to 
the country’s political and economic transitions and its integration into the 
global economy. By 1977, Spain faced a severe, multifaceted crisis with 
deeply intertwined political and economic factors. Transforming Spain’s 
economic model was considered necessary to address the acute social tensions 
that threatened the democratization process.37 
Spanish economic agents reached a consensus regarding the main lines of 
reform necessary to transform Spain into a democracy and a modern, open 
economy. In 1977, representatives from all political parties with parliamentary 
representation, the Prime Minister, and some members of government came 
together in a private meeting. During this meeting they debated the objectives, 
instruments, and specific measures necessary to turn around the Spanish 
economy and to recognize and protect basic civil liberties. The two 
agreements resulting from these negotiations—one for economic reforms and 
another for civil liberties—were collectively called the Moncloa Pacts. The 
pacts were voted on in Parliament, approved by representatives of the two 
main unions, and endorsed by the employers’ association.  
The economic pact asked specifically for the central bank to conduct an active 
monetary policy, expressed the need to develop a set of measures aimed at 
increasing the reaction capacity of the economy to exogenous shocks, and 
called for the progressive liberalization of the financial system.38 The 
development and implementation of these ideas was understood to be a long-
term process of change that could not be achieved solely through government 
fiat.39 
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The Moncloa Pacts provided focus and direction to the program of economic 
reforms that followed. Initial reforms aimed to reinforce the powers of the 
Banco de España (BdE)—the Spanish central bank—to conduct monetary 
policy, develop effective bank supervision mechanisms, and set the basis for 
liberalization. Because of the macroeconomic nature of these measures, the 
BdE was responsible for taking the initiative and developing a reform strategy. 
However, the government and the BdE could not achieve the transformations 
they envisioned without accommodating the interests of the Big 7. They 
controlled the financial system and constituted the most powerful economic 
group in the country. If all the banks had formed a united front against reform 
the state would have found it impossible to proceed. Even if the state had 
passed legal reforms, the banks would have found ways to circumvent them, 
rendering institutional change ineffective.  
The power of the Big 7 exceeded the logical influence that financiers have in 
any economy. At the time of Franco’s death in 1975, banking was the only 
strong, privately run sector in the nation. Franco had nationalized firms in 
other sectors, such as telecommunications, in the 1940s but he resisted 
demands to nationalize the Big 7 because they had supported him during the 
civil war.40 As mentioned in section 3, the Big 7 dominated the Spanish 
financial system and their position had been reinforced through legislation that 
limited competition from other credit institutions and enabled the banks to 
self-regulate.41 In addition, thanks to their economic expertise, the Big 7 had 
heavily influenced government decision-making during Spain’s economic 
boom in the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, between 1946 and 1975, big bank 
board members occupied 213 decision-making positions in the executive, 
legislative, or regulatory bodies such as the BdE.42 
More specifically, to implement their vision, the government and the BdE 
depended on active cooperation from the Big 7 because they lacked sufficient 
tools to do it autonomously. A central bank can exercise monetary policy 
through two mechanisms: variation in interest rates or control of the monetary 
base growth. The first mechanism requires an active interbank lending market. 
The second mechanism requires synchronization with the banking system, 
especially big banks, because banks expand the monetary base through their 
standard credit operations. In the late 1970s, Spain had a rudimentary 
interbank lending market that was insufficient to enable the BdE to exercise 
monetary policy through variations in interest rates.43 Due to the private nature 
of big Spanish banks, the state could not impart instructions and expect the 
banks to follow them; agreement needed to be built through negotiation. 
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Realizing the need for long-term collaboration with the Big 7, the Vice 
President of Economic Affairs Fuentes Quintana pressed for the creation of a 
representative industry body with which the state could negotiate. The result 
was the creation of the Asociación Española de Banca (AEB)—the Spanish 
banking association—in 1977. Fuentes Quintana obtained the appointment of 
a sympathetic industry representative at the AEB, Rafael Termes, the president 
of Popular and a self-defined liberal.44 
The state needed the Big 7 to agree to a more powerful BdE and to the 
principle of economic liberalization. The Big 7 were expected to oppose the 
BdE’s reforms because the strength of the BdE came at the expense of the Big 
7, and liberalization was likely to drive down interest rates, reduce banks’ 
margins, and threaten their control of the market. However, the Big 7 did not 
constitute a homogeneous group, and their diversity translated into different 
strategic preferences toward the state’s needs. This created an opportunity for 
the state to advance reform through cooperating with some of the big banks. 
Hispano Americano, Central, and Banesto were the largest and most 
conservative of the Big 7. They had grown under the Francoist regime and had 
the most to lose from any changes to the status quo. Unsurprisingly, these 
banks opposed reform and adopted a defensive stance toward the changes that 
followed. For example, in 1986 Banesto opposed and defeated an acquisition 
offer from Bilbao, even though Banesto was in such a weak financial position 
it was subsequently intervened by the BdE. 
Bilbao, Vizcaya, and Popular were smaller than the three conservative banks, 
but they were the most efficient of the Big 7 and their presidents were 
considered forward-looking and progressive.45 These three banks had the most 
to gain from a shift to an orthodox institutional architecture that rewarded the 
sound banking strategies they already practiced. Therefore, they were willing 
to support the government’s reforms provided the state accommodated their 
concerns. In fact, Popular’s liberal president became the chief interlocutor 
with the state through the AEB, and Bilbao and Vizcaya benefited from the 
BdE’s reforms by expanding their national footprint and negotiating a friendly 
merger.  
Finally, Santander was a conservative bank with only a regional footprint. As 
the smallest of the Big 7, its best strategy was to be a fast follower. In fact, in 
the market reshuffle that followed initial reforms, Santander’s president 
voluntarily retired (the only Spanish banker of the Francoist generation to do 
so) in favor of the younger, progressive candidate Emilio Botín. 
                                                 
44 Fuentes Quintana (1985); Termes (1991). 
45 Rivases (1988); Interviews. 
Differences in the strategic preferences of the Big 7 provided an opportunity 
for the state to carry out reform with support from the progressive banks. To 
obtain the cooperation of these banks the state needed to accommodate their 
concerns. As mentioned earlier, big Spanish banks were strictly for-profit 
entities. They opposed market competition with foreign and domestic rivals, 
because they expected it have a direct negative impact on their bottom lines. 
Some banks were also vocal about wanting to eliminate mandatory investment 
coefficients and increase the interest rates at which preferential sectors could 
borrow, because these instruments tied up bank resources to unprofitable 
investments and harmed banks’ earnings.46 Ultimately, the initial reform 
package for the banking sector reflected these concerns and cemented the 
negotiated nature of state-bank interactions. 
Royal Decree 1,839/1977 established the progressive reduction of mandatory 
coefficients from approximately 40 percent to 21 percent and brought interest 
rates for preferential industries close to market rates. Royal Decree 1,388/1978 
authorized the installation of foreign banks in Spain but imposed heavy 
constraints on their operations. Royal Decree 1,839/1977 eliminated 
restrictions that barred savings banks from offering the same range of products 
as banks, but the decree maintained geographical restrictions for the expansion 
of savings banks, thereby limiting their ability to compete directly with the 
Big 7. Restrictions to competition were long lasting. Foreign banks did not 
operate in equivalent conditions to Spanish banks until 1993, and savings 
banks were not allowed to freely expand their geographical footprint until 
1989. The terms of these reforms were also indicative of the weakness of 
industry relative to banks. By constraining competition, Spanish banks 
continued to charge double-digit interest rates in the midst of an acute 
economic crisis that choked even profitable firms. For example, in 1980 the 
president of the AEB admitted to charging 20 percent interest rates.47 
These banking reforms were quickly followed by a set of measures that 
strengthened the BdE. Some of these measures reinforced the independence of 
the BdE relative to the Big 7. For instance, Law 30/1980 dismissed 
professional bankers from decision-making roles at the BdE and substituted 
them with public employees. Law 30/1980 also established a system of 
incompatibilities between public and private employment in the banking 
sector. Additional measures bolstered the BdE’s power to conduct monetary 
policy by building the infrastructures and institutions necessary to create a 
well-developed interbank lending market. For example, in 1976, the BdE 
introduced a telephony-based interbank exchange system, the first step toward 
an operational, real-time payment system. This mechanism was also a valuable 
source of information about the operations of the Big 7 enabling the BdE to 
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monitor potential disequilibria.48 In addition, the BdE introduced a rigorous 
micro-prudential supervisory mechanism for systemic banks49 one of the first 
of its kind. Big banks became subject to constant supervision through a team 
of inspectors that worked full-time at the supervised banks. The BdE also 
acquired indirect powers over the decision-making structures of big Spanish 
banks through its ability to veto candidates for board-level positions. 
A second episode of this period, the resolution of the 1977–1985 banking 
crisis, offers additional testimony to the cooperative and mutually beneficial 
nature of the Spanish model and showcases the competence of the economists 
at the BdE. By 1977, Spain faced a significant banking crisis. Between 1977 
and 1985, fifty-one banks out of the existing one hundred and ten banks, 
which accounted for 20 percent of the country’s deposits, were rescued. To 
address the crisis, the BdE could have opted for one of two strategies: one 
based on long-term nationalizations of ailing banks or one based on private-
sector turnarounds. Both strategies required significant amounts of capital for 
the initial rescue operation and banking expertise for the subsequent 
turnaround. However, whereas the first option relied primarily on public funds 
and talent, the second option relied on resources from the Big 7. 
A nationalization strategy was not consistent with the Moncloa Pact’s 
commitment to move toward a market-based system, and it would have put 
considerable pressure on Spain’s struggling public finances. Instead, the BdE 
opted for private-sector turnarounds. The BdE created the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund,50 which was funded through contributions from banks. The fund bought 
the majority of an ailing bank’s stock at a symbolic price, restructured it with 
talent from other banks, and then sold it off via public auction.51 In exchange 
for their cooperation, big banks benefited from opportunities to purchase 
rescued banks at symbolic prices. The progressive banks, especially Bilbao, 
Vizcaya, and Santander used the opportunity to expand their national 
footprint.  
However, turnaround operations could involve substantial costs, and the Big 7 
did not always have the option to decline. Traditional banks, whose financial 
positions had weakened over the course of the 1970s oil crises, suffered these 
drawbacks most. For example, the BdE attributed the turnaround of Urquijo, 
Spain’s largest industrial bank, to Hispano Americano because of historical 
ties between the two. The cost of absorbing Urquijo’s losses forced Hispano to 
post negative annual results in 1984 and cancel its annual issue of dividends. 
None of the Big 7 had ever cancelled a dividend and the measure sent a 
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powerful signal regarding Hispano Americano’s financial problems. By 1991, 
Hispano Americano had ceased to be an independent bank. 
As befits a negotiated arrangement based on interdependencies, the Big 7, 
particularly the progressive banks, were not the only beneficiaries of the 
BdE’s turnaround strategy. The contrast between the BdE’s swift management 
of the banking crisis and the government’s slow approach to industrial 
restructuration, revealed the technical strengths of the central bankers, 
particularly those of a cohesive network of young economists formed at the 
BdE’s research department. Unlike the leaders of most progressive banks, who 
belonged to northern Spain’s industrial bourgeoisie and had received an 
education in business economics at the University of Deusto, central bankers 
were recruited primarily from the faculty of economics at Madrid’s 
Complutense University and nurtured by Luís Angel Rojo, an academic at 
Complutense and the director of the BdE’s research department between 1971 
and 1988.52 These economists supported market-oriented reforms and a central 
bank fully equipped to control the system’s liquidity. The rigorous 
macroeconomic orthodoxy of this group of economists and their strong 
professional credentials also contrasted with the corruption, inefficiency, and 
nepotism that had characterized the civil service during Francoism. 
The management of the banking crisis generated a broader set of benefits for 
these young economists that ultimately strengthened Spain’s coordination 
model. Upon the Socialist Party’s victory in the 1982 general election, the new 
government recruited talent from the BdE to fill top policy-making positions. 
The first Minister of Economics and Industry and his successor until 1993 
were BdE-trained economists. After a ministerial reorganization in 1986, 
many of those in second-tier positions also had similar backgrounds or at least 
compatible opinions.53 Under this new economic leadership, the relationship 
between the BdE and the government became fluid. The relationship between 
the BdE and the progressive banks also strengthened, developing a stronger 
policy-making dimension and remaining locked within a tight group of 
individuals comprising professional bankers, central bank-trained individuals, 
and a small group of academics and state economists who also came to occupy 
positions of responsibility. These groups constituted the core of Spanish 
economic policy making.  
Nonetheless, the consolidation of the rising BdE elite and the implementation 
of the measures they defended were neither flawless nor undisputed. The 
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combination of limited banking competition and a decrease in mandatory 
investment coefficients affected manufacturing sectors negatively at a time of 
profound economic crisis. Unable to find affordable, long-term credit to 
restructure, many industrial firms were forced to downsize, sell their 
operations to foreign investors, or close. Between 1977 and 1996, the 
contribution of manufacturing to Spain’s GDP decreased by 9 percentage 
points, more than the United Kingdom’s during the same period.54 
Unsurprisingly, the economists’ prioritization of macroeconomic orthodoxy 
and financial reform to the detriment of productive industry generated 
opposition. Vice-Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra advocated an alternative 
strategy based on public deficits and strong support for industrial employment 
but France’s experience weakened his arguments.55 The two largest unions 
also opposed the government’s strategy and organized a successful general 
strike that forced the government to soften some of its restructuration 
measures after 1988. However, by then industrial decline was significant, and 
the government did not reverse course. Ultimately, the economists’ defeat of 
their opposition showcases the secondary role of industry relative to the state 
and the big banks in the Spanish model. 
5.2 Consolidation (1986–1993) 
The features that enabled the development of the Spanish model in the 
previous decade—the state’s commitment to modernization and development, 
the compatibility between the goals of the state and the interests of some of the 
Big 7, and the need for these actors to cooperate to achieve their respective 
aims—persisted and even strengthened after Spain joined the European Union 
in 1986. This explains why, despite changes in the external context, the 
Spanish model consolidated in 1986–1993, underpinning the competitive 
transformation of big Spanish banks.  
By the mid-1980s, the BdE had strengthened its powers to conduct monetary 
policy and develop effective supervision mechanisms to ensure the stability of 
the financial system. As Spain joined the EU in 1986 and prepared for the 
inauguration of the Single Market, priorities shifted toward liberalizing and 
modernizing the banking sector. 
Whereas the policy goals of the previous decade had a strong macroeconomic 
character, the modernization and competitive transformation of the banking 
sector were microeconomic challenges. Because the Big 7 were fully private 
firms, the initiative and strategies necessary to transform them into 
internationally competitive firms rested with the banks. The state could 
support and help shape the process but could not carry it out. 
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To incentivize and shape banking modernization, the state could have chosen 
three different strategies: it could have (1) encouraged modernization through 
market competition by eliminating barriers to the expansion of savings banks 
and FDI; (2) shaped bank transformation along the lines of the German 
banking system, by introducing legal incentives for the development of 
stronger bank-industry connections; or (3) incentivized banks to undertake 
restructuration by lowering the banks’ risks and costs of doing so. This last 
option, however, left the initiative for transformation to the big banks. The 
state chose to lower the risks and costs of restructuration, underscoring the 
state’s support for the goals of the progressive banks and its reliance on banks’ 
initiative to jump-start modernization. This approach also reflected the state’s 
concern about banking stability and the need to prevent speculative 
investments.  
As before, the Big 7’s preferences derived from an analysis of threats and 
opportunities to their banks. The three conservative banks continued to resist 
changes to their status quo, and their resistance became more entrenched as 
the direction of change increasingly threatened their interests. The progressive 
banks, Bilbao, Vizcaya, and since 1986 Santander,56 saw the Single Market as 
a unique business opportunity. However, they were conscious of the necessity 
to transform their structures and business strategies to take advantage of the 
opportunity and avoid losing control of their entities to potential European 
rivals.  
The three main challenges of big Spanish banks relative to their European 
rivals were size, high fixed costs, and productivity. Size was a particular 
concern for the progressive banks because they were better run than the 
conservative banks but also smaller, which made them more attractive to 
potential acquirers. The fastest path to growth was mergers and acquisitions, 
but the banks faced several obstacles. If the sector was liberalized 
immediately, banks risked being acquired by foreign investors before having 
the chance to adjust and grow organically. The risk of unwanted acquisitions 
increased the costs of carrying out mergers. Furthermore, mergers and 
subsequent changes to the banks’ boards of directors required approval by the 
BdE. Finally, mergers needed to be followed by structural reforms aimed at 
decreasing personnel costs and substituting expensive, older employees who 
typically had no university education, with less costly, university educated, 
and more productive new hires. However, these reforms contravened the legal 
terms of existing lifelong contracts and were expected to be expensive. 
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As mentioned above, the state chose a strategy based on lowering the risks and 
costs or restructuration. This strategy combined the BdE’s preference for firm-
led banking restructuration and its concern for financial stability with a 
developmental stance that reinforced support for the progressive banks. Full 
market liberalization was delayed until 1993. Instead, the state imposed tight 
controls over FDI. Law 26/1988 mandated that anyone taking control of 5 
percent of the social capital of a bank needed to inform the BdE, and 
participations over 15 percent required a specific authorization. This 
protection was necessarily temporary because Spain was scheduled to join the 
Single Market in 1993, but it enabled the Big 7 to undertake mergers and 
restructuration with minimal interference from foreign competitors until then. 
The government’s defensive approach also aimed to prevent speculative 
investments that could cause instability in the financial sector. This was, for 
instance, the purpose of Minister Solchaga’s request that the Kuwait 
Investment Office withdraw its stake in Banco Central in 1987.57 Controls 
over FDI in banking contrasted markedly with the country’s generally liberal 
approach to FDI in most other sectors and illustrates the preferential treatment 
toward banks. In 1986, Spain introduced legislation that enabled foreign 
investors to invest in most sectors under the same conditions as resident 
Spaniards.58 By 1992, Spain’s share of world FDI represented about 5 to 6 
percent, a much higher share than Spain’s 1 percent share of global GDP. 
The BdE preferred a strategy of mergers between a progressive bank and a 
traditional bank and assumed that the progressive bank would lead the merged 
entity. However, after Bilbao’s failed attempt to purchase Banesto, progressive 
and traditional banks opted to merge among themselves, spotlighting the 
persistent differences between progressive and traditional banks and the 
independence of banks from the state’s criteria. The first merger in 1987 
consisted of an alliance between two progressive banks, Bilbao and Vizcaya, 
to form BBV. The two largest traditional banks, Central and Hispano 
Americano, merged in 1991 to form BCH. In line with their defensive 
approach, the merger between Central and Hispano Americano aimed to 
prevent progressive banks from launching a hostile takeover.  
The government incentivized banks’ restructuration by helping negotiate and 
fund downsizing operations. Employment at Spanish commercial banks 
decreased continuously between 1980 and 2004 by a total of 70,000 jobs. 
Between 1995 and 2000 alone, Spanish commercial banks downsized by 
27,000 employees, while France decreased by 8,000 and Germany and the 
United Kingdom increased employment by 5,000 and 14,000, respectively.59 
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Most layoffs took the form of voluntary pre-retirement agreements generously 
funded by the state, which contributed approximately half of the pensions. 
The state did not introduce any incentives for the development of long-lasting 
relationships between banks and industry, along the lines of the German 
model. This approach would have likely delayed the BdE’s modernization 
objectives while countering the for-profit ethos of the Big 7. Progressive 
banks, especially Santander, had relatively small industrial investments and 
were unwilling to participate in industrial decisions outside their field of 
expertise. By contrast, the three biggest conservative banks had large but often 
incoherent industrial investments.60 A German-like strategy would have 
involved supporting the position of the traditional banks—who opposed 
modernization, and antagonizing at least some of the progressive banks In 
addition, the provision of patient capital for industry is normally associated 
with bank strategies that are not solely based on profitability61; therefore, 
incentives to provide patient capital would have contradicted the state’s 
general pro-market approach and conflicted with the banks’ for-profit ethos.  
The protective stance of the state and its restructuration measures lowered the 
risks and costs of transforming the banking sector, and progressive banks 
embraced the opportunity. In 1989, Santander, followed later by BBV, 
launched innovative savings products that started a deposit war which signaled 
the breakup between progressive and traditional banks. The internal 
restructuration mentioned above lowered fixed costs significantly. In addition, 
following a first round of mergers in Spain, progressive banks engaged in an 
expansion spree in Latin America. Along with being a defensive strategy 
against unwanted acquisitions, internationalization boosted profitability by 
increasing the banks’ volume of operations and allowing banks to benefit from 
Latin America’s larger interest spreads. Moreover, the diversification of 
operational risk inherent to internationalization protected banks against future 
economic downturns in Spain, making them more solid and competitive. 
The above pattern of collaboration between the BdE and the progressive 
bankers to achieve the modernization of Spanish banks showcases the 
interdependencies and mutual-collaboration pattern characteristic of the 
Spanish model. The following factors also distinguished Spain’s non-
hierarchical coordination from state capture: (a) the consistency between the 
guidelines for economic reform in the Moncloa Pacts and the policy choices of 
the BdE, (b) the leadership position of the BdE in facilitating the 
modernization process, and (c) the diversity of opinions between progressive 
and traditional banks and between traditional banks and the state. The 
innovative and proactive attitude of the progressive banks also contrasts 
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significantly with theoretical expectations of low innovation, lack of initiative, 
and shallow structural transformation usually associated with the state capture 
hypothesis.62 
In Spain, 1986–1993 was also characterized by the development of more 
permanent institutional foundations to support the dialogue and interpersonal 
negotiations that characterize state-firm interactions in Spain. Luís Angel 
Rojo, the father of the BdE elite, was instrumental in creating two bodies: 
Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA)—Foundation for 
Applied Economy Studies, a research center financed by the BdE, big banks, 
and a few other large Spanish corporations; and Centro de Estudios 
Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)—Center for Monetary and Financial 
Studies, a private postgraduate education foundation founded by the BdE that 
is a direct source of talent for the central bank and other civil service positions.  
5.3 Resilience (1993-2014) 
The coordination dynamics between the state and big banks set in motion in 
the previous decades evolved without significant alterations through a change 
of government, the introduction of the euro, and the internationalization of big 
Spanish banks in the 1990s and 2000s. The model persisted because these 
events did not alter the premises on which it was based: direct interactions 
between a tight group of professional civil servants and career bankers, 
autonomous actors, compatible state and bank objectives, and equilibrium 
between the actors’ capabilities and resources.  
Many of the individuals who held decision-making responsibilities in the 
previous socialist party administrations continued to play critical roles in 
policy design and implementation after the conservative party came to office 
in 1996. For instance, Luís Angel Rojo, who had become governor of the BdE 
in 1992, remained in his post until 2000 and was responsible for designing the 
monetary policy that enabled Spain to join the euro, premier Aznar’s main 
aspiration. The government’s drive to qualify Spain for the euro also prompted 
a new wave of bank mergers that finalized the modernization of big Spanish 
banks and consolidated the progressive banks’ leadership. The acquisition of 
BCH by Santander in 1999 to form BSCH represented the final installment of 
the war among conservative and progressive banks. The bitter squabbles 
between BCH and Santander executives over strategic direction only ended 
when the last representatives of Spain’s conservative banking philosophy 
renounced their executive positions in 2001 and 2002.63 
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State autonomy continued to be evident during this period. For instance, the 
conservative party governments did not hesitate to use the tools at their 
disposal to eliminate those they disagreed with. In 2000, Ybarra, the president 
of BBVA, was forced to renounce his post among a scandal related to offshore 
secret accounts. The issues in question preceded Ybarra’s presidency, and it is 
generally accepted that the case surfaced at the behest of premier Aznar and 
those close to him as a response to intense criticism of Aznar on a TV channel 
controlled by the Ybarra family. 
The internationalization of big Spanish banks in the 1990s and 2000s could 
have unraveled the equilibrium on which the Spanish model was based 
because internationalization diversifies risks and reduces a bank’s dependence 
on operations in a single country.64 However, recent evidence shows that the 
performance of big Spanish banks in major international markets remains 
sensitive to changes in Spain’s macroeconomic conditions. This may be due to 
the fact that Spanish financial institutions are large holders of Spanish public 
debt (41 percent of outstanding debt in 201365). A comparison between 
Santander’s quotations in the London Stock Exchange FTSE index and the 
evolution of the price differential between the Spanish ten-year bond and the 
German ten-year bond up to January 2014 illustrates a strong correlation 
between investors’ perception of Santander and the evolution of the Spanish 
sovereign debt crisis. Nonetheless, in the future, the size of big banks could 
unravel the Spanish model. 
Table 5 Santander’s FTSE monthly stock performance and Spain’s bond 
differential in 2007–2014.66 
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6. Conclusions and future research 
This paper explored the interactions between national institutions and the 
competitive transformation of big commercial banks in the context of late 
industrializing, transitional, and peripheral economies through the analysis of 
the Spanish case. The paper argued that bank-state coordination in the Spanish 
model was a non-market, non-hierarchical cooperation based on negotiated 
exchanges of benefits and the combination of the capabilities of the two 
actors. Such a system evolved from historical circumstances in which the state 
and the most progressive among the big banks had compatible goals that they 
were unable to accomplish autonomously.  
In its origin in the late 1970s, the Spanish model had a strong developmental 
component, but its configuration differed from those of earlier, European post-
war models. Unlike conventional state-led institutional structures, the state in 
the Spanish model needed to accommodate the interests of private big banks to 
implement its plans because it did not have the tools to implement its vision 
autonomously, or to coerce the banks into doing it. Although the Spanish 
model was based on state-bank cooperation, it was different from other 
consensual alternatives in which banks with a developmental mandate 
compromised their profitability to provide patient capital for industry. Despite 
the central position of the big banks in the Spanish model, the state’s 
commitment to economic development, the consistency between such a 
commitment and policy formulation, and the existence of a cohesive group of 
skilled civil servants safeguarded the state from capture by the banks. These 
institutional differences had a critical impact on Spain’s hybrid form of 
capitalism, which came to favor the competitive transformation of big banks 
and the modernization of Spain’s financial system through non-market 
coordination, yet exposed downstream industry to market rigors in a way that 
contributed to its decline.  
The Spanish case underscores the importance of exploring the relative 
positions of key actors to understand their strategic preferences in relation to 
institutional change. The Spanish case also shows the impact of institutional 
transformation in enabling banks to overcome historical competitive 
disadvantages and unleash their potential. Finally, the Spanish case shows how 
institutional bargains in the banking sector affect the transformation of the rest 
of the economy, and it provides a historical explanation for the development 
of hybrid models of capitalisms in which priority sectors operate through non-
market coordination but others are left unsheltered from market forces.  
There are limitations to an analysis based on a single case. Further 
comparative research is needed to determine what factors affect the 
development of different types of institutional structures in the banking sector 
and what types of barriers may prevent a drift toward state capture or bank 
capture situations. Comparisons with other late industrializing economies 
whose transformations run parallel to global processes of liberalization, in 
Europe or in other regions would be particularly useful. The non-hierarchical 
nature of state-bank coordination in the Spanish model could also be explored 
further. Analyses of state-firm coordination in other industries could help 
identify possible variants of non-hierarchical coordination, respond to 
questions regarding the conditions under which non-hierarchical coordination 
emerges, and evaluate the impact on different configurations of state-firm 
interaction on the competitive transformation of firms. Examples of sectors in 
which state-firm coordination is a structural feature—as is true of the banking 
sector—would make good comparisons. 
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